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Aftershocks of the Loss of the Legislative
Veto: Severability and the Need for a
Replacement Device
The Honorable James T. Broyhillt
Jane Sutter Starkett
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitu-
tions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths dis-
covered and manners and opinions change, with the change of cir-
cumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the
times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which
fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under
the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.'
I. Introduction
In June of 1983, the Supreme Court, in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,2 found the legislative veto to
be unconstitutional.' The Court's decision was exceedingly
broad in both its scope and its impact. As a result, the opinion
has been criticized for its expansiveness4 and, in particular, for
t Senator Broyhill served in the United States House of Representatives, repre-
senting the Tenth District of North Carolina for 23 years, and also served in the United
States Senate. He is presently Chairman of the North Carolina Economic Development
Board.
ft Former Associate Minority Counsel, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
United States House of Representatives. Presently associated with Eckert, Seamans,
Cherin and Mellott.
Copyright © 1987 James T. Broyhill & Jane Sutter Starke All Rights Reserved.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), inscribed on
the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.
2. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3. Id. at 959.
4. The decision has been criticized by some commentators as overly broad in scope.
See Strauss, Was there a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Moses, Re-Separating the Powers: the
Legislative Veto and Congressional Oversight after Chadha, 33 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 145
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its rigid constitutional analysis. The decision's "myopic"5 rea-
soning becomes apparent once the function and use of the legis-
lative veto is recognized.
The legislative veto device enabled the Congress, acting
alone, to review and, if the circumstances dictated, to disapprove
the action proposed to be taken by an independent regulatory
agency or the executive branch. This device was a means by
which Congress could ensure that statutes it designed were ef-
fectively and correctly implemented.
The legislative veto was a simple tool which Congress could
use to make certain that authority delegated to an independent
agency or to the executive branch was carried out in a manner
consistent with specific, legislative direction. As recognized by
one commentator, the legislative veto permitted Congress to
monitor the implementation of its policies, without the need of
enacting additional legislation.7 If the authority was exercised
improvidently, or in contravention of legislative intent, Congress
could simply "veto" the proposed action, preventing the contem-
plated action from taking effect.
As such, the veto was simply a way to monitor and to con-
trol the actions of the unelected bureaucracy and to ensure that
the policymaking role was retained by the legislative branch.8 It
was a mechanism which promoted accountability to the Con-
gress and ensured that critical legislative decisions were made,
(1984-85). Indeed, Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of the Court on the basis
that the decision's reasoning was broader than necessary. The narrower basis the concur-
rence relied on in finding the legislative veto unconstitutional was that its use in deter-
mining whether the statutory criteria for residence had been met was an assumption of a
judicial function by the legislative branch in violation of the principle of separation of
powers.
5. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S.
1216 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
6. A legislative veto provision typically is a provision included in a statute which
requires an administrative agency or the Executive to submit a proposed regulation or
contemplated action to the Congress for review. Congressional review is usually for a set
period of time during which it can either specifically "veto" (disapprove) or, in some
cases, approve the proposed regulation or action.
7. Javits and Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 455, 456 (1977).
8. As noted by Justice White, the legislative veto is "an important if not indispensa-
ble political invention" that preserves "Congress' control over lawmaking." Chadha, 462
U.S. at 972-73 (White, J. dissenting).
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or at least reviewed, by the Legislature.
This Article will discuss the significant role the legislative
veto has played in reviewing and controlling the activities of the
administrative agencies and the impact the Chadha decision has
had on this congressional oversight. In the "wake" of the
Chadha decision, the question of whether an unconstitutional
legislative veto provision can be severed or removed from the
body of a statute has come to the forefront. The following will
examine the analytical framework used by the courts in making
these severability determinations, and the consistency of these
analyses with congressional intent surrounding the inclusion of a
legislative veto provision. Finally, the Article will discuss the
continuing need for a replacement mechanism for the legislative
veto in order to facilitate Congress' ability to reassert its legisla-
tive prerogatives and to regain its control over the exercise of
delegated functions.
II. Background
The legislative veto was first used to review presidential
plans for reorganization of the Government, which at the time
was growing in size and scope in response to the Depression.'
Thereafter, the legislative veto, as characterized by Justice
White, was used as a means to help balance the delegation of
authority in new areas of government involvement and to resolve
disputes between the executive and legislative branches over al-
locations of power.10 Over time, the broad delegations of author-
ity were sanctioned by the courts. This was based in part on a
realization that it was impractical for Congress to shoulder the
burden of making the numerous and detailed policy decisions
required to ensure the efficient functioning of an increasingly
large Government." Consistently, the executive and indepen-
dent agencies were empowered to issue rules, decisions and or-
ders which had the full force and effect of a law in order to effec-
9. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 969-70. The legislative veto has appeared in nearly 200 statutes ranging
from budget impoundments, war powers, the space program, international agreements on
nuclear energy, and education grants, to rulemaking by consumer protection agencies. Id.
at 967-72. See also id., app. at 1003.
11. Bruff and Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1977).
19871
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tively implement and enforce delegated authority. 2
As Congress increasingly delegated substantial authority, it
sought to retain for itself some modicum of control over the ad-
ministration of that authority through the use of the legislative
veto.' s3 The legislative veto not only gave Congress that control,
but it also enabled Congress to legislate by articulating broad
policy goals, leaving the implementation of specifics to the entity
with developed expertise.' 4 This was the beauty of the legislative
veto: it recognized the need for and growth of the modern ad-
ministrative state spawned by the increasing complexity of our
society while it retained legislative control in the branch en-
trusted with that authority under the Constitution. This "fourth
branch of government," which amassed considerable authority,
was able to retain the necessary flexibility to administer the
grant of power, while Congress, through the use of the legislative
veto, could effectively oversee the exercise of that power. The
legislative veto represented a "string" or contingency attached
to a delegation of authority. Since the function being performed
was originally that of the Congress, it was only appropriate that
the regulatory end product be reviewed by that branch in which
the fundamental authority resided. To this extent, the legislative
veto actually enhanced the legislative role of the Congress under
the Constitution. It promoted the principle of separation of pow-
ers, rather than violating it.
III. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
A. The Majority Opinion
Given the function and utility of the legislative veto, it is
somewhat curious that the Supreme Court in Chadha found the
legislative veto to be inconsistent with the separation of powers
doctrine. At issue in Chadha was a one-House legislative veto
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act.'" Under the
Act, Congress retained the ability to review and veto suspen-
sions of deportation of aliens issued by the Attorney General."
12. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4), (5), (6) (Supp. 1985).
13. Javits and Klein, supra note 7, at 462.
14. Id. at 460.
15. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1254. The congressional review process typically involves the same
[Vol. 7:609
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The House of Representatives vetoed the suspension of a de-
portable alien, Jagdis Rai Chadha.' 7 The majority opinion, au-
thored by Chief Justice Burger, determined that the House's ac-
tion was "legislative in purpose and effect."'" Specifically, it
found that the "House took action that had the purpose and ef-
fect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons
As the House's action affected Chadha's status, the Court
found that the Constitution allowed Congress to legislate in only
one way - using the article I procedures of bicameral passage
of legislation and presidential presentment.2 0 The one-House
legislative veto, by definition, permitted Congress to act, without
the necessity of both Houses acting on a disapproval resolution
or of invoking the President's veto power. As such, the Court
concluded that the device exceeded Congress' defined powers
and was inconsistent with the integral design of the Constitu-
tion, providing for the separation of powers among the three
branches of government.2The Court let the precise structure of the Constitution gov-
ern its analysis of the legislative veto. It deferred to the "explicit
and unambiguous" provisions of the Constitution which define
the executive and legislative functions and disperse power
among the separate branches.22 The design of the Framers was
strictly adhered to, as part of an effort to fulfill the purposes
underlying the legislative procedures of article I and the role of
the President in the lawmaking process.23 Since, in the Court's
analysis, the one-House veto violated the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements of the Constitution, the Congress failed
to comply with the required constitutional procedure when it
utilized the veto.
The Court placed great emphasis upon the intent of the
activities used in the consideration of legislation. The committees of jurisdiction often
hold hearings in which testimony is solicited from interested parties, followed by formal
consideration in committee and action in one or two Houses.
17. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40247 (1975).
18. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 958.
21. Id. at 957-58.
22. Id. at 945.
23. Id. at 946.
1987]
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Framers to divide and disperse power among the branches as a
means to best protect liberty.4 It recognized that the Constitu-
tion sought to divide the powers of the government into three
defined categories, legislative, executive and judicial, "to assure,
as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would
confine itself to its assigned responsibility."2 In the eyes of the
Court, the careful delineation of the separate functions in the
Constitution promotes stability and a check on any one branch
assuming excessive power. While the Court conceded that the
branches are not necessarily "hermetically"2 6 sealed from one
another, it did give conclusive weight to the fact that since a
body of Congress was acting, it necessarily had to strictly abide
by the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment require-
ments. Even though the legislative veto may be a useful way to
"accomplish desirable objectives, 2 7 the Court admonished the
Congress to resist the "hydraulic pressure inherent within each
of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power."2 8
The Court's opinion recognizes that the legislative veto was
a "convenient" device, which enabled Congress to act more eas-
ily and, perhaps, more efficiently. Yet, the Court set aside con-
cerns of efficiency as a goal of the Framers of the Constitution in
structuring the legislative process. Instead, the Court found that
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and present-
ment predominated the interests of efficiency. As articulated by
the Court: "Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government
... ."2 Rather, "[w]ith all the obvious flaws of delay, untidi-
ness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better
way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power
subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution. "0
24. Id. at 950.
25. Id. at 951.
26. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)).
27. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 944.
30. Id. at 959.
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6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/3
LEGISLATIVE VETO
B. The Dissent
This issue of efficiency was the springboard for Justice
White's dissent. A key premise of the dissent was that mere con-
venience is not the driving force behind the use of the legislative
veto.," As the dissent recognized, the legislative veto was much
more than a convenient tool for a lazy Congress. Rather, its util-
ity in ensuring responsiveness to the Congress was acknowledged
and its death mourned:
Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's
choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority,
leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requi-
site specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the
entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-
making function to the Executive Branch and independent agen-
cies. To choose the former leaves major national problems un-
resolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking
by those not elected to fill that role.3"
Justice White was unwilling to engage in a strict and textual
constitutional analysis of the legislative veto. Rather, the dissent
approvingly quoted Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyers
as the appropriate perspective to take:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of
its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government."4
Justice White viewed the Constitution as a viable, working
document which has the flexibility to respond to contemporary
needs and modern problems of governance, without forsaking es-
sential democratic principles."' The dissent feared that the un-
necessary and complete separation between the branches would
"handicap the effective working of the National Government as
31. Id. at 972 (White, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
34. Chadha, 462 U.S at 978 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
35. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 978 (White, J., dissenting).
1987]
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a whole."' 6
Indeed, the methodical separation of powers, without con-
sideration of the objective of an interdependent and functioning
tripartite government, reflects a blindness on the part of the
Court to the needs of the modern administrative state. It also
ignores the utility of the legislative veto in promoting respon-
siveness consistent with the constitutional system of checks and
balances, 7 enhancing Congress' role as lawmaker.
Justice White exposed the inconsistency in the Court's rea-
soning which countenanced extensive delegations of authority to
independent and executive agencies, yet forbade the use of the
legislative veto to review the exercise of that authority. As suc-
cinctly put by Justice White, the former reflects a recognition of
the need for "accommodation and practicality."3 8 The latter ig-
nores the need for a "necessary check on the unavoidably ex-
panding power of the agencies"3 9 as they exercise power dele-
gated by the Congress.
C. Analysis of the Decision
Clearly, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for and
the efficiency brought by the delegation of authority and, with
few exceptions, 40 has uniformly upheld broad delegations as con-
stitutional. The problem that the dissent raised was one of con-
sistency. The Court has seen fit to allow broad delegations of
authority resulting in the growth of administrative agencies, yet,
in Chadha, it has read the Constitution narrowly so as to "forbid
Congress [from] qualify[ing] that grant [of authority] with a leg-
islative veto. '41 Past recognition of the need to construe the
Constitution with some flexibility was set aside in Chadha. It
has been replaced with a strict adherence to the legislative pro-
cedures dictated in article I. The same considerations of effi-
ciency that permit delegations of power should consistently form
the basis for retaining some of that authority through the legis-
36. Id. at 999 (White, J., dissenting).
37. See Javits and Klein, supra note 7.
38. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999 (White, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
41. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 989 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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lative veto.
It is indeed curious that the Court has not viewed expansive
delegations of authority by Congress as an abdication of its role,
while it refuses to sanction a reservation of that same authority
through the use of the legislative veto.42 As Justice White
remarked:
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and
Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand [article] I as
prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on legislative
power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies receiving delega-
tions of legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue regula-
tions having the force of law without bicameral approval and
without the President's signature. It is thus not apparent why the
reservation of a veto over the exercise of that legislative power
must be subject to a more exacting test.43
It is for this reason that the Chadha decision is short-
sighted. The legislative veto ensures that Congress plays the role
of policymaker and legislature. As such, the device promotes the
concept of separation of powers by enhancing the role of Con-
gress in reviewing the exercise of delegated functions by admin-
istrators. Congress, as a result, can carry out its constitutional
functions more effectively while promoting the system of checks
and balances inherent in the doctrine of separation of powers.
As articulated by Justice White, the legislative veto is "a reser-
vation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its
designated role under [article] I as the Nation's lawmaker.""
One commentator has noted that the legislative veto serves
to effectuate the legislative will, and also
functionally preserves the separation of powers: by returning the
final policymaking authority to the Congress, it is assured that
the lawmaking powers will not be exercised by any other branch
of the government. Without this check, certain congressional
powers would be lodged outside of the legislative branch in viola-
tion of the doctrine of the separation of powers.45
42. See Bledsoe, Separating Power: No Legislative Veto of Agency Action, 49 Mo.
L. REv. 404 (1984).
43. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986-87 (White, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Moses, supra note 4, at 150-51 (footnote omitted). See also Saks, Holding the
Independent Agencies Accountable: Legislative Veto of Agency Rules, 36 AD. L. REv. 41,
1987]
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, as Justice White's dissent points out, the regula-
tions and decisions issued by independent and executive agen-
cies "meet the Court's own definition of legislative action""6
since they alter the legal rights and duties of others and involve
policy determinations, yet they are not subject to the same re-
quirements for legislative action under article I. The majority
opinion dismissed in a footnote47 the issue of whether executive,
or for that matter, independent "lawmaking," through the issu-
ance of decisions or regulations by administrative agencies, must
follow the article I process. The Court's analysis failed to recog-
nize that the use of the legislative veto simply registers a "nega-
tive," ' 8 as demonstrated by the one-House disapproval veto pro-
vision in the Immigration and Nationality Act. As pointed out
by Justice White, the power to exercise a legislative veto is not
the power to write new, affirmative law without comporting with
the article I procedures, just as the presidential veto power does
not confer lawmaking power on the executive. 9
Some commentators have criticized the Court for its formal-
istic approach which relies heavily on characterizing action as
"legislative" in nature simply by identifying the acting branch.50
If the executive branch were to promulgate a regulation, the
Court would regard such action as "executive" in nature regard-
less of the fact that such a regulation has the same legal effect as
legislation passed by both Houses of Congress. The Court was
almost obsessed with compartmentalizing the particular action
involved. While this is consistent with the Court's separation of
powers analysis and its rigid structural view of the Constitution,
it is incompatible with its prior decisions which facilitated the
growth of the modern administrative state. 1
As one commentator noted, "[c]ongressional action in re-
53 (1984) ("By preserving the core role of Congress as policy determiner, a legislative
veto enhances rather than diminishes the purpose of separation of powers.").
46. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 989 (White, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 953-54 n.16.
48. See S. REP. No. 492, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986).
49. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 980 (White, J., dissenting).
50. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 797; Bledsoe, supra note 42, at 412.
51. See Schwartz, The United States Supreme Court and the Laying of Regula-
tions before the Legislature, 100 LAW Q. REV. 9, 11 (1984) ("The Chadha opinion is
based upon the type of formalistic construction of the separation of powers doctrine that
would have made the rise of modern administrative law impossible.").
[Vol. 7:609
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sponse to the demands of modern government has been ex-
amined under one standard, while congressional action in re-
sponse to the modern government thus created appear to be
examined under a different standard." 2 The dynamic nature of
our society must be reflected in the way in which our Constitu-
tion is construed and applied, by avoiding overly formalistic and
static interpretations. The vitality of the Constitution as a func-
tioning and integrated document should be recognized in the
way our nation approaches its contemporary method of
governance.
IV. Severability
The preceding discussion identifies the utility of the legisla-
tive veto in promoting the accountability of agencies to the Con-
gress and ensuring consistency with legislative intent. In the
wake of the Chadha decision, the need to ensure responsiveness
to the Congress has grown. Congress does have several means to
review the activities of independent and executive agencies short
of legislation, through hearings, riders on appropriations bills,"
reporting requirements, and investigations. Yet, none is as effec-
tive or as decisive as the legislative veto.
The void created by the Chadha decision is highlighted by
recent judicial determinations on the issue of severability. These
cases focus on the question of whether an unconstitutional veto
mechanism is severable from the body of a statute.
If the veto mechanism is found severable, the remaining
statute will be upheld as constitutional. However, if it is not sev-
erable, then the entire statute falls with the unconstitutional
veto provision. The resolution of the severability problem ap-
pears to hinge on three factors the presence of a severability
clause; congressional intent; and the ability of the underlying
statute to function in the absence of the legislative veto provi-
sion." The outcome of these cases often turns on the relative
52. Bledsoe, supra note 42, at 420.
53. A "rider" is typically an amendment, attached to an appropriations bill, restrict-
ing the expenditure of funds for a particular activity or program or making substantive
changes in the law.
54. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35 (1983).
1987]
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weight afforded these different factors in the courts' analyses. 55
The severability of legislative vetoes relates directly to many of
the pivotal, separation of powers issues discussed by the Court
in Chadha. If a legislative veto is severed, there is necessarily a
shift in power to that entity which is exercising the function del-
egated by Congress. Congress no longer has control over the con-
templated action; the string attached to the delegation has been
cut.
A. Severability in Chadha
The Chadha decision disposed of the severability issue ini-
tially, in an almost perfunctory manner. The Court cited as the
operative standard the severability test in Buckley v. Valeo,5"
which favors severing the invalid provision "[u]nless it is evident
that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is not
. .. ., However, the Court declined to "embark on that elu-
sive inquiry '5 8 of examining legislative intent. Instead, it gave
presumptive weight to the presence of a severability clause 59 in
the underlying statute. These clauses typically provide that if a
provision of an act is found unconstitutional, the remaining pro-
visions are not affected and remain intact. The Court read this
provision as "unambiguous" 0 evidence of congressional intent,
plainly authorizing the presumption of severability. Only after
establishing such a strong presumption did the Court examine
the statute's legislative history. The Court conceded that Con-
gress was "reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation
of deportations," but determined that such reluctance was "not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of severability ... 61
The Court reached this conclusion on the basis that there was
inadequate evidence showing that Congress would have pre-
55. The relative weight afforded the presence or absence of a severability clause -
which varies from presumptive weight in the case of the former to insignificant weight in
the case of the latter - is a good example.
56. 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976).
57. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 108 (1976)).
58. Id. at 932.
59. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 406, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
60. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932.
61. Id.
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ferred to retain the authority over suspensions of deportation,
rather than delegate this function to the Attorney General, had
it known that the legislative veto provision was
unconstitutional.62
Greater emphasis was given by the Court to the presence of
the severability clause, while evidence of legislative desire to re-
tain the ability to review suspensions of deportation through the
veto mechanism was regarded as less consequential. 3 The boil-
erplate severability clause was regarded as virtually conclusive
evidence of severability, despite a reading of congressional intent
which tended to rebut the presumption of severability. This
analysis appears to give insufficient weight to the legislative his-
tory which showed a reluctance on the part of Congress to com-
pletely delegate this function and remove itself from the suspen-
sion process altogether. Instead, the Court examined whether
Congress would have opted, in the alternative, to retain the full
authority delegated.
This inquiry is insensitive to the practical legislative options
that are available to Congress in drafting legislation and fashion-
ing a delegation of authority. Congress could include more de-
tailed statutory criteria to govern the exercise of the authority or
limit or revoke the authority delegated altogether, if the legisla-
tive veto could not be used. Narrowing the inquiry to an artifi-
cial all-or-nothing choice often results in an inaccurate view of
legislative intent, as the significance attached to the underlying
statute tends to predominate the inquiry. The importance of the
legislative veto to the statutory scheme tends to become over-
shadowed and subsumed.
The third part of the Court's severability inquiry relied on
the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commission,"' which states that a provision
will be presumed severable if what remains after severance is
fully operative as a law. Finding that the administrative process
could function independently of the legislative veto, the Court
62. Id. at 934.
63. Id. at 932. Specifically, the Court stated that "[ajlthough it may be that Con-
gress was reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such
reluctance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of severability raised by § 406."
64. Id. (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932)).
1987]
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concluded the provision was severable.6
A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, and
joined in by Justice White, dealt solely with the issue of sever-
ability. The opinion recognized the presumptive weight given to
the presence of a severability clause, but criticized the majority
opinion for its blindness to the significance of legislative intent.
Simply, it recognized that the existence of a severability clause
does not "conclusively resolve the issue."66 Rather, it agreed
with the Court in United States v. Jackson, when it stated that
the ultimate determination of severability "will rarely turn on
the presence or absence of such a clause. "67
The dissent favored an analysis which focused more closely
on legislative intent. The standard it preferred was one which
severed the unconstitutional veto provision only if Congress
would have intended to permit the Attorney General, exercising
delegated authority, to suspend deportations without the con-
gressional opportunity to veto. s The dissent's reading of the leg-
islative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act departed
from that of the majority opinion, in that it read the Act as
demonstrating an unwillingness on the part of Congress to give
the executive branch the ability to suspend deportations on its
own." Rather, it found that Congress consistently sought to re-
tain some modicum of control.
The dissent viewed severing the unconstitutional veto provi-
sion as tantamount to expanding the authority of the Attorney
General in a way which the Congress did not intend.10 If the
veto provision were severed, the authority delegated to the At-
torney General would, in the dissent's view, necessarily become
enlarged, as his decisions would no longer be subject to
mandatory review and possible veto by Congress. Indeed, by
definition, a legislative veto provision is a contingency placed on
65. Id. at 935 (footnote omitted). The Court likened the aborted process that would
result after severance to a report and wait procedure. The Attorney General would still
transmit decisions regarding suspensions for congressional review. If Congress objected,
it could pass legislation to overturn the decision.
66. Id. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n. 27 (1968)).
68. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1015 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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a delegation of authority, which if removed, necessarily results
in a shift or imbalance in power in contrast with that contem-
plated by Congress. Severance would then effectively "redraft"
the underlying statute in a manner which does not comport with
legislative intent. As succinctly put by Justice White, "the
Court's rewriting of the Act flouts the will of Congress." 7'
B. Severability After Chadha
Since the Court's Chadha decision, a rash of litigation has
ensued over the severability of legislative veto provisions in a
variety of statutes. In large part, courts have found these provi-
sions to be severable based on an effort to divine congressional
intent and an attempt to save the statute as a working docu-
ment.71 In some instances, a veto provision is found inseverable,
usually based on a finding that Congress would not have com-
pletely delegated the underlying authority to be exercised with-
out reserving for itself the opportunity for a veto. 3
The analytical differences of these cases can be seen in the
relative significance afforded by the courts to the presence of a
severability clause, the intent of Congress in structuring the leg-
islation, and the ability of the law to operate absent the veto
provision. The Supreme Court in Chadha gave presumptive
weight to the presence of a severability clause and, only seconda-
rily, examined congressional intent. In the absence of a sever-
71. Id. at 979 n. 16 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd
sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S.
1216 (1983); National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 629 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C.
1985); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 852 (1984); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.
1984). See also Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis 97
HARV. L. REV. 1182, 1184 (1982) ("Modern courts have refused to assume dogmatically
that legislatures would not have passed statutes but for the statutes' legislative veto pro-
visions. Courts have instead developed flexible techniques for determining legislative in-
tent - techniques that in recent years have tended to yield findings of severability.").
73. EEOC v. CBS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983), appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1232
(1984), remanded, 740 F.2d 966 (1984); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce,
697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982); City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
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ability clause, the required analysis is less clear.7"
Many courts have relied on the standard enunciated in
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission,75 which per-
mits severance unless a showing can be made that it is "evident"
Congress would not have enacted the legislation without the
veto provision. Few are willing to strike down the entire statute
absent a strong showing that the veto provision is "insepara-
ble"'76 from the body of the statute or is an "integral and neces-
sary part of the legislative scheme ... .
V. The Severability Clause: Its Significance
The absence of a severability clause has been afforded vary-
ing weight, as demonstrated by the litigation involving the Reor-
ganization Act of 1977.78 In EEOC v. Hernando Bank,"9 the
Fifth Circuit found the one-House legislative veto provisiono in
the Reorganization Act of 1977 to be severable. At issue was
whether the EEOC had authority to enforce the Equal Pay
Act.8' Enforcement authority had been transferred from the Sec-
retary of Labor to the EEOC by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1978,82 promulgated by President Carter under the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1977.
The Act authorized the President to reorganize the execu-
tive branch and its agencies, subject to congressional review.
Under section 906 of the Act, a reorganization plan would be-
74. See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 441 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("The presence of a severability clause, which expressly sets forth congressional
intent that a statute stand in the event one of its provisions is struck down, makes it
extremely difficult for a party to demonstrate inseverability. When there is no such
clause, however, as in this case, the test is less certain." (footnotes omitted)). The Su-
preme Court recently commented that in the absence of a severability clause, "Congress'
silence is just that - silence - and does not raise a presumption against severability."
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1481 (1987).
75. 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
76. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
77. EEOC v. CBS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1977)).
78. The authors are indebted to Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in American Public
Law, Congressional Research Service, for the research in this section.
79. 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
82. 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978).
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come effective 60 days after transmittal to Congress unless ei-
ther House passed a resolution of disapproval. Although no veto
was exercised, a question arose as to whether the transfer of en-
forcement authority was valid as it was accomplished pursuant
to an unconstitutional legislative veto. Simply, the inquiry was:
can the statutory scheme and reorganization remain, absent the
veto provision?
The court, in noting the absence of a severability clause in
the Reorganization Act of 1977, was tempted to draw an infer-
ence of nonseverability but declined to give any real significance
to the failure of Congress to incorporate a severability provision
into the statute.83 Instead, it relied on the finding in United
States v. Jackson that "the ultimate determination of severabil-
ity will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a
clause,"84 as justification for ignoring any inference that could be
drawn from the absence of a severability provision.
The ability of the judiciary to manipulate a severability
analysis to achieve a particular result becomes clear when the
consistency of the reasoning used is examined. One must ques-
tion a court's analysis when severability is virtually concluded if
a severability clause is present, yet its absence is regarded as
insignificant. As one commentator has remarked, "a court favor-
ing severability can give apparently presumptive weight to the
presence of a severability clause, but it can reject presumption
rhetoric in the absence of such a clause by simply stating that
the severability issue cannot be decided on the basis of the mere
absence of the clause."85 The amount of deference given to the
83. M. Rosenberg, The Legislative Veto in the Courts: Constitutional Challenges
Before and After Chadha 60-61 (unpublished manuscript).
84. EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)). The court also expressly disregarded the views of
a Member which clearly indicated that a severability clause was deliberately left out
because the legislative veto provision was viewed as an integral part of the legislative
scheme. See also Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. 946, 953 (W.D. Tenn. 1983),
aff'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984). But cf. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
570 F. Supp. 1224, 1231 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (giving greater significance to Member's state-
ments, noting that "[allthough not dispositive of the intent of Congress, the statements
of one of the legislation's sponsors 'deserves to be accorded substantial weight in inter-
preting the statute.'" (quoting Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548, 564 (1976)).
85. Note, supra note 72, at 1186. See also Cross, Legislative Veto Provisions and
Severability Analysis: A Reexamination, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 537, 551 (1986).
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presence or absence of a severability clause appears to vary, in a
manner that will often yield a finding of severability.
Instead of pursuing an inquiry of the significance that
should be afforded to the absence of a severability clause, the
court in EEOC v. Hernando Bank turned to an analysis of
whether Congress would have enacted the remainder of the Act
without the veto provision. In examining the purpose behind en-
actment, it was evident that Congress delegated the reorganiza-
tion function to the President for reasons of efficiency and expe-
diency. Although specific limitations were placed on the
reorganization authority,"' the court recognized the inherent
structure of the legislation in which Congress retained control
over the substantive operations of the government and chose to
allocate the reorganization authority to the President. The court
concluded that nothing in the legislative history and the lan-
guage of the Act itself "indicates that Congress would not have
enacted the Reorganization Act without the legislative veto pro-
vision or that Congress even considered the issue of
severability. 8
7
Similarly, in EEOC v. City of Memphis,8 8 the court relied
on the "modern rule"89 put forth in Consumer Energy Council
of America v. FERC.90 Again examining the severability issue
raised by the Reorganization Act of 1977, the court noted the
absence of a severability clause, but dismissed its significance,
citing the FERC decision, which regarded the question of where
the presumption lies as "mostly irrelevant," serving only to "ob-
scure the crucial inquiry [of] whether Congress would have en-
acted other portions of the statute in the absence of the invali-
dated provision. ' 91
Instead, the court's analysis turned on the importance of
eliminating waste and overlap in the bureaucracy through reor-
ganization under the Act. The court surmised that, given the un-
derlying purpose of the statute, Congress would likely have in-
tended to retain those programs transferred under the Act,
86. EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1984).
87. Id. at 1191.
88. 581 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
89. Id. at 181.
90. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 442.
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instead of seeing them "perish" with the legislative veto. The
fact that Congress has repeatedly appropriated funds to the
EEOC for enforcement of transferred functions was regarded by
the court as "ratification" by the Congress of the transfer.92
In EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co.,93 again litigating the va-
lidity of the EEOC's enforcement of the Equal Pay Act, the
court gave some significance to the absence of a severability
clause, commenting that it "suggests the inseverability of the
provision." 9' The court referenced Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,95 in
which the Supreme Court viewed the absence of a severability
provision as creating a presumption that the Legislature in-
tended an act to be effective as an entirety; "that is to say, the
rule is against mutilation of a statute; and if any provision be
unconstitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provi-
sions fall with it."'
The court examined in detail the legislative history of the
Act to determine if Congress would have delegated the reorgani-
zation authority to the President without reserving for itself the
review power inherent in the veto provision. It found that while
Congress had some questions as to the constitutionality of the
veto mechanism, it did seek to retain control over the reorgani-
zation process through the veto provision. 7 The decision noted
that an amendment had been proposed to restrict the remedy a
court may grant upon reviewing the constitutional status of a
reorganization plan to that single plan before it, rather than to
all such plans previously passed. 8 It took pains to clarify that
the amendment was not offered "to in any way sever the one
house veto provision from the remaining parts of the Act,"99 but
92. See also Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. at 946, affd on other
grounds, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (The circuit court of appeals did not agree with the
district court on the issue of ratification.).
93. 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
94. Id. at 1230 n.18.
95. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
96. Carter, 298 U.S. at 312 (footnote omitted).
97. See EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1230, 1232.
98. 123 CONG. REc. 9363 (1977). See Schwartz, The Enforcement Authority of the
EEOC: The Legislative Veto Provision in the Reorganization Act of 1977, 33 U. KAN. L.
REV. 101, 118 (contends that the nature of the amendment indicates an assumption of
nonseverability and awareness on the part of Congress of the possibility of employing a
severability clause).
99. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. at 1232.
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simply to limit the effectiveness of an unconstitutional finding.
Although the court gave considerable weight to the legislative
history, it was likewise clear that the deliberate absence of a sev-
erability clause was given added significance. It concluded that
the veto provision was "an integral and inseparable part of the
grant of power to the President."100
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion of insever-
ability in EEOC v. CBS, °' but based its decision purely on an
analysis of congressional intent. Recognizing that the Congress
had delegated reorganization power to the Executive, the court
focused on the effect of severance on congressional control over
the reorganization process. Severance would give the statute "a
positive operation"' 2 beyond congressional intent and in a way
that was inconsistent with the legislative history. 03
The fact that this particular legislative veto provision con-
tained expedited procedures for congressional consideration of
executive action was seen as strengthening the role of Congress
in the reorganization process.0 4 Expedited procedures are spe-
cial procedures which amend the internal rules of the particular
House for its consideration of legislation. 0 5 They typically in-
clude procedures for mandatory referral of legislation to particu-
lar committees, hastening committee consideration of a disap-
proval resolution, time limits on floor debate, and privileged
consideration on the floor. 10 6 These procedures are essential to
ensure the expeditious handling of veto resolutions in the time
frame specified for congressional review. Unfortunately, their in-
clusion is often regarded as controversial because they alter the
traditional rules for handling legislation, preempting the prerog-
100. Id.
101. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (1984).
102. Id. at 1129 (quoting Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90, 95 (1886)).
103. M. Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 62.
104. EEOC v. CBS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1130. See also Muller Opti-
cal Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. at 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) aff'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d
380 (6th Cir. 1984); Alaska Airlines Inc., v. Donovan, 594 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1984),
rev'd, 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986).
105. For Procedures of the House of Representatives, see W.H. BROWN, CONSTITU-
TION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 1013 (1985) (the document also includes exerpts from those statutes with legis-
lative veto provisions including those with expedited procedures).
106. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, § 21, 15 U.S.C. §
57a-1 (Supp. III 1985) (omitted as terminated).
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atives of the congressional leadership. However, expedited pro-
cedures ensure timely consideration of veto resolutions and con-
sequently enhance congressional control over the exercise of the
delegated authority. 1 7
While most courts in reviewing the Reorganization Act of
1977 found the veto provision to be inseverable,'05 it is indeed
interesting that Congress responded to the Second Circuit's
opinion in EEOC v. CBS by enacting legislation which ratified
all past reorganization plans which had been implemented. 09
The Congress also amended the Reorganization Act" to put
greater restrictions on the President's authority. This latter
piece of legislation replaced the one-House disapproval mecha-
nism with a two-House joint resolution of approval."' Under
this procedure, reorganization plans would not take effect unless
both Houses approved the action through passage of a joint res-
olution, which is presented to the President for signature or
veto." 2
The law expressly provides that failure of a House to act
within the specified time frame for congressional review is
equivalent to disapproval of the resolution." 3 Expedited proce-
107. See H.R. REP. No. 128, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1 (1983). In reporting H.R.
1314, the Committee on Government Operations remarked that the use of expedited pro-
cedures was an accommodation to ensure a vote on reorganization plans and was an
attempt to preserve as much of Congress' legislative authority as possible. Accord H. R.
REP. No. 128, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1984).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 1104, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 4, at 15 (1984).
109. Pub. L. No. 98-532, 98 Stat. 2705 (1984)(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. III
1985)). Any plan that had been disapproved by Congress would not be affected by the
legislation.
110. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192
(1984)(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. III 1985)). This legislation also extended the
President's reorganization authority until December 31, 1984, and put further restric-
tions on the exercise of that authority.
111. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 909 (Supp. III 1985).
112. A joint resolution is a device used by Congress as an alternative to a bill. Ac-
cording to Jefferson's Manual, a joint resolution is a bill so far as the processes of the
Congress in relation to it are concerned. Joint resolutions are sent to the President for
approval and have the full force and effect of law, once signed or, if vetoed, if overridden
by the Congress with a two-thirds vote. W.H. BROWN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MAN-
UAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 397 (1985).
113. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 906(a) (Supp. III
1985)). Some Members view the approval mechanism as effectively a one-House veto.
See 130 CONG. REc. H2520-21 (daily ed. April 10, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Levitas):
Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Executive and Agency Actions After Chadha:
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dures are still included to ensure prompt consideration by the
Congress. Clearly, Congress' response to the litigation on the Re-
organization Act of 1977 can be seen as an attempt to wrest
greater control over the reorganization process and to assure its
participation. As a result, the effectiveness of reorganization
plans depends upon congressional determinations. A shift in
control back to Congress has resulted.
VI. Recognizing the Function of the Legislative Veto:
Congressional Review and Control
The Second Circuit's decision in EEOC v. CBS recognized
that the legislative veto provision was included by Congress to
promote and ensure congressional oversight of delegated actions.
This is the proper focus for a severability analysis in that it ac-
knowledges the true function of the legislative veto. Rather than
straining the analysis in favor of severability by creatively divin-
ing legislative history or seeking justification in the cloak of pre-
serving the remainder of the statute, the judiciary should engage
in a true reading of congressional intent in making the delega-
tion and the basis for retaining a veto. Often, for example, veto
provisions are built into the legislation to permit Congress to re-
visit an issue if the circumstances at the time the legislation is
considered are uncertain enough for a firm determination to be
made.
This was in all likelihood the thought behind the inclusion
of a legislative veto provision in the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978.114 The veto, by definition, was a means through which
Congress could consider at a later point in time the effects of
incremental pricing of natural gas and the wisdom of expanding
it beyond an initial phase."' The uncertainty of effect, coupled
with the desire to assess the situation after a preliminary phase
had been implemented, argued for congressional review of future
regulatory proposals. Although the court in Consumer Energy
"The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEo. L.J. 801, 806 (1984). Despite this char-
acterization, the Department of Justice views the approval mechanism as constitutional.
See H. R. REP. No. 128, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 22-23 (1983).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 3417 (1982).
115. See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442-43 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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Council of America v. FERC116 recognized that Congress wanted
to reserve judgment on the need for an extension of incremental
pricing, it severed the unconstitutional veto. The court's deci-
sion was based on a finding that Congress had made a tentative
decision in favor of an extension of the program, through its del-
egation of authority to FERC, thus evidencing an intent on the
part of Congress that it would have enacted the remaining stat-
ute in the absence of the veto provision. 1  The legislative veto
provision, by its nature, afforded Congress an opportunity to
take a "second look" and to make an informed judgment on an
issue with substantial policy implications. The result reached by
this decision on the severability question was insensitive to the
function of the veto and the apparent intent of Congress in its
inclusion.
The test for severability, enunciated in the circuit court
opinion in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan,"' illustrates this
point. The court set forth the question of legislative intent as
one under which it must be shown that Congress would have
preferred no statute or delegation of authority in the absence of
the legislative veto provision. 119 While consistent with the
Court's analysis in Chadha, and subsequently in considering this
particular case,'2 0 this test is an all-or-nothing inquiry which
gives no consideration to the question of whether Congress
would have passed an alternative version of the law if it were
assured that the legislative veto provision was unconstitu-
tional.' 2' To engage in this type of analysis is equivalent to con-
116. 673 F.2d 425, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
117. Id.
118. 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
119. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)(No. 85-920).
120. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1481 (1987), in which the Su-
preme Court held: "The final test for legislative vetos [sic] as well as for other provisions
is the traditional one: the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the provi-
sion created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted." (foot-
note omitted). In affirming the circuit court's finding of severability, the Supreme Court
primarily focused on the legislative history of the Act, concluding that congressional in-
terest in the veto provision was minimal. It further found that the strong direction of the
Act's language independently required all carriers to hire protected employees, rendering
the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, as well as the legislative veto provision
attached to that regulatory authority, to be of little import in the statutory scheme.
121. Id. at 1560. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
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struing legislative intent with blinders on. It ignores the differ-
ent legislative options available to Congress and the nature of
the deliberative process in drafting legislation. By imposing an
artificial straitjacket on the inquiry of congressional intent, the
result reached will often favor severance of the unconstitutional
provision because Congress clearly preferred an enactment to
none at all.'22
Looking at the consequences of severability is a useful ana-
lytical tool. The district court, in Alaska Airlines,123 was reluc-
tant to sever the veto provision because to do so "might be an
approximation of what Congress would have enacted. The task
of determining the most preferential alternative to an unconsti-
tutional statute belongs not to the courts, but to the Congress
itself."' 12' The judiciary should be hesitant to "rewrite" a law, in
the guise of severance. This often not only contravenes legisla-
tive intent, but also works an imbalance in power between the
legislative branch and the agency to which the authority is dele-
gated. 2 5 As noted in the Petitioner's brief citing McCorkle v.
United States, "[w]hen the questioned clause restricts a power
granted by the legislature, the case against severance is strong.
Otherwise, the scope of the power would be enlarged beyond the
legislature's intent.' ' 26 The deliberate effort to save as much of
the underlying statute when making severability determinations
can result in a judicial preemption of legislative prerogatives. 27
Examining the effect of severance and comparing it with con-
gressional intent would prevent this intrusion by the judiciary.
It is also consistent with and promotes the concept of separation
of powers in that it ensures that the allocation of power inherent
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984), for a similar analysis. See also Brief for Peti-
tioner at 9, Alaska Airlines, Inc. (No. 85-920).
122. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Alaska Airlines, Inc. (No. 85-920).
123. 594 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1984).
124. Id. at 94 n.3.
125. In the Supreme Court's consideration of the severability of this legislative veto
provision, it appropriately recognized this point. It stated: "[T]he more relevant inquiry
in evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent
with the intent of Congress. In considering this question in the context of a legislative
veto, it is necessary to recognize that the absence of the veto necessarily alters the bal-
ance of power between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Federal Govern-
ment." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1481 (1987).
126. 559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1101 (1978).
127. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Alaska Airlines, Inc. (No. 85-920).
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in the statutory scheme is preserved. " ' Not only does it avoid
manipulation by the judiciary, but it also acknowledges the con-
stitutional role of Congress as lawmaker and defers to its delega-
tion of authority.
Recent litigation over the severability of a legislative veto
provision in the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
19741" has focused on congressional control over the budget
process and the power relationship between the branches. In
City of New Haven v. United States,3 0 the court examined the
President's authority to defer the spending of funds for four
housing programs under § 1013 of the Act.'' Under the proce-
dures of the Act, the President is required to notify Congress of
a proposed deferral of funds and must make amounts available
for obligation if either House disapproves the proposed deferral.
Expedited procedures are included to provide for timely han-
dling and voting on disapproval resolutions.
The court found that the veto provision was inseverable and
the President's authority to defer invalid. In reaching its deci-
sion, the impact of a finding of severability was assessed to de-
termine if the result would comport with congressional intent.
Simply, the analysis is result-oriented 32 in that it sought to de-
termine whether severance would accomplish a legislative result
consistent with what Congress sought to achieve. The court gave
128. See Shirley, Resolving Challenges to Statutes Containing Unconstitutional
Legislative Veto Provisions, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1808, 1822 (1985) (argues that a sever-
ability analysis should focus on the power relationship between the branches reflected in
the statute in determining the importance of the veto provision to the legislative
scheme).
129. Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, § 1013, 2 U.S.C. § 684 (Supp.
III 1985).
130. 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd in part, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
131. Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, § 1013, 2 U.S.C. § 684 (Supp.
III 1985).
132. The court noted that a similar analysis was conducted in American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which found an unconstitu-
tional committee-approval mechanism in an appropriations bill inseverable. The provi-
sion restricted the use of funds to reorganize the Department of Housing and Urban
Development before a certain date without the prior approval of the Committees on Ap-
propriations. The court concluded that Congress would not have placed a flat prohibition
on reorganization in law and refused to sever the unconstitutional committee-approval
language as that would have been the result. (Despite this decision, committee-approval
mechanisms are still routinely inserted in appropriations bills. See, e.g., Urgent Supple-
mental Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-349, 100 Stat. 710 (1986).
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considerable significance to the legislative history of the Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 in its decision. It charac-
terized that history as one in which Congress was "intent on re-
covering its primacy in matters of money and spending"'133 and
sought to "wrest control over the budget from what is perceived
as a usurping Executive .... "'u The Act was viewed as a culmi-
nation of a quest by Congress to restrict the President's power
to impound funds and to reassert control over the budget pro-
cess through the use of notice requirements and veto provi-
sions. 1 35 As an "integral component of the control machinery,"136
it was recognized that severance of the veto provision would de-
stroy legislative control over the budget process, which was the
sine qua non of enactment."3 '
The court thus appears to have relied almost exclusively in
its severability inquiry on the legislative intent of retaining a
legislative veto and the desire of Congress to remain a pivotal
player in the budget process. Although the court concluded that,
absent a veto provision, Congress would not have conceded "any
deferral authority to the President at all",'38 its analysis did not
focus precisely on this question. Clearly, the court engaged in
the appropriate inquiry in which the result of severability and
its consistency with congressional intent was of primary
importance.
The remaining factors in the court's severability analysis
were given less significance. The fact that the Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act did not contain a severability clause was
mentioned in a footnote together with the inference that its ab-
sence was not dispositive, but merely evidence of congressional
intent. 39 Likewise, the question of whether or not the statute
would be operable without the veto provision was given short
shrift. While recognizing that the Congress has been overturning
133. City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.D.C. 1986).
134. Id. at 1454.
135. The President's authority to rescind or cancel the spending of funds is subject
to approval by Congress through passage of a recission bill, within 45 days of transmittal
of the President's notification of recission. Budget and Impoundment Control Act, §
1012, 2 U.S.C. § 683 (Supp. III 1985).
136. City of New Haven, 634 F. Supp. at 1456.
137. Id. at 1459.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 1453 n.4.
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deferrals through the inclusion of language in appropriations
bills, the court noted that such action does not demonstrate that
the Budget and Impoundment Control Act is operable. Rather,
it illustrated that the Congress was acting pursuant to the con-
stitutional requirements for legislating. 140 No scrutiny was made
of the functioning of the deferral process without the use of a
congressional veto, unlike other decisions where courts have con-
cluded either that a report-and-wait procedure would keep the
statute effectively working" or that Congress could simply en-
act legislation overturning the proposed action. 42
The District of Columbia Circuit Court, in City of New Ha-
ven v. United States,"'4 considering the same issue, used a simi-
lar analysis. The court was preoccupied with the legislative his-
tory prompting the inclusion of the legislative veto, focusing in
particular on the manner in which the statute would operate
without the legislative veto and its consistency with congres-
sional intent.""' The absence of a severability clause was again
noted in a footnote, accompanied by a comment that the court
"need not rely on the absence of a severability clause to support
our holding of inseverability" because "more direct evidence of
congressional intent conclusively establishes that Congress
would not have intended section 1013 to survive excision of its
legislative veto provision. " 5
In the 99th Congress, efforts were made to address the
deferral issue through the introduction of legislation amending
the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974148 and
through amendments to appropriations bills. Legislation was in-
troduced, but not acted upon, to submit deferrals proposed by
the President for approval by Congress through the passage of
140. Id. at 1459.
141. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F. 2d 1550 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C.
1985).
142. National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 629 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C.
1983).
143. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 905-06.
145. Id. at 905 n.15.
146. S. 2229, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4205, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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deferral bills.14 The effect of such legislation would be to treat
deferrals in the same manner that recissions are now treated
under the Act. Another bill would have replaced the one-House
veto mechanism with a joint resolution of disapproval 14 8 in an
attempt to maintain the original intent of Congress in structur-
ing the deferral process. What type of review mechanism is used
to replace the unconstitutional veto provision will, of course, de-
termine whether the Executive or Congress has the greater edge
in controlling deferrals.
The Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Bill'49 for fiscal
year 1986 contained a provision which made the President's
deferral authority inapplicable to appropriations made in the
bill and in subsequent appropriations acts.' 50 This proposal was
not without controversy. Those who supported this proposal
viewed the residual authority left to Congress to disapprove de-
ferrals as inadequate, because corrective legislation had to be
passed. Although deferrals are routinely disapproved in appro-
priations bills,1"' it was feared that even with specific legislation
disapproving deferrals, 2 the President still retained the ability
to defer funds which have been appropriated in legislation he
147. Id.
148. H.R. 4618, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Legislation was also introduced to re-
peal the deferral authority in its entirety (H.R. 2247, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)). A
House resolution was also proposed, expressing the sense of the Congress that the defer-
ral authority was unconstitutional due to the presence of an inseverable legislative veto
(H.R. Res. 411, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), in the hope of creating legislative intent for a
reviewing court to consider.
149. H.R. 4515, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
150. H.R. 4515, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1986). See also H.R. 5234, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 315 (1986), which provided that the President's deferral authority did not
apply to funds appropriated by the bill. This provision was deleted by the Senate. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 649, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1986).
151. Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-349, 100 Stat.
710 (1986). See also debate on H.R. 5234, Department of Interior Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1987, 132 CONG. REC. H5205 (daily ed. July 31, 1986) for statement of the
Office of Management and Budget in opposition to the use of committee vetoes.
152. The Deferral Process After Chadha, 1986: Hearing on the Deferral Process as
Provided by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 Before
the Committee on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 124, 131 (1986) (Statement of Milton J.
Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, GAO). Interestingly, the proposed
language in § 201 of H.R. 4515 was regarded by some as ineffectual in repealing the
deferral authority since this authority is not completely derived from § 1013 of the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act. See id. at 54 (Statement of Richard Ehlke, Spe-
cialist in American Public Law, Congressional Research Service).
[Vol. 7:609
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/3
LEGISLATIVE VETO
has signed. As a result, the President could wield a line-item
veto of sorts, which some view as a disruption of the balance of
power between the branches."' 3
This provision was deleted in conference at the insistence of
the Senate.154 Assurances had been given by the executive
branch that no policy deferrals would be proposed for the bal-
ance of 1986.156 This agreement was designed to bring a tempo-
rary cease-fire to the ongoing political struggle. While the consti-
tutional status of the deferral procedure is still in doubt, a shift
in power has inured to the President. To some, this may be re-
garded as a preferable outcome even though it may be an acces-
sion of power away from Congress.
There is considerable thought among fiscal conservatives
that the President should retain strong deferral authority as an
appropriate means to curb unnecessary spending. 5 ' The Presi-
dent's role in the budget process is critical in preventing ineffi-
cient and unjustified expenditures, consistent with the nature of
the executive function. To counterbalance this power, the Con-
gress should play a pivotal role in reviewing, and if necessary,
disapproving proposed deferrals, as the legislative veto provision
had enabled it to do. As noted by one commentator, the Act had
delineated a careful boundary between the Executive and Con-
gress, "allowing for considerable discretion in the operation of
the executive branch while permitting Congress an opportunity
153. A line-item veto power would enable the President to veto particular portions
of a bill, while approving other portions of the same bill presented to him for signature.
See remarks of Congressman Brooks and Congressman Panetta, 132 CONG. REC. H2548-
50 (daily ed. May 8, 1986) debating an amendment offered by Congressman Armey to
delete § 201 of H.R. 4515. See also The Deferral Process After Chadha, 1986: Hearings
on the Deferral Process as Provided by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 Before the Committee on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1986)
(Statement of David Vladeck, Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group).
154. See S. REP. No. 301, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986). The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended deletion of the House language due to "procedural implica-
tions" it would pose in the Senate.
155. See Statement of Congressman Whitten, 132 CONG. REc. H4105 (daily ed. June
24, 1986); H.R. REP. No. 649, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1986) (explaining that the deletion
of the provision is based on assurances from the Office of Management and Budget that
no further policy deferrals would be proposed for the balance of the calendar year, also
noting that deletion would allow the courts time to address the deferral issue and the
Congress to act in future legislation).
156. See Hearing of the Committee on Rules, supra note 152, (statement of James
C. Miller, Director of the Office of Management and Budget).
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to reiterate its previously stated intent with regard to the pro-
gram at issue. '15 The balance between the branches struck in
the Budget and Impoundment Control Act that was disrupted
by the Chadha decision needs to be restored. The search to re-
place the veto provision and the congressional power it repre-
sented should begin quickly if Congress is to regain its budget-
ary prerogatives. The type of mechanism chosen and the
political climate that surrounds its choice will determine the al-
location of power among the branches.
VII. Replacement for the Legislative Veto
In other areas as well, Congress has begun to search for al-
ternatives to the legislative veto. There is a continuing interest
on the part of Congress to secure and retain control over its
delegations. The need to ensure agency accountability and re-
sponsiveness, which has been disrupted by the Chadha decision
and by subsequent decisions on the severability issue, endures.
The veto mechanism was a political tool which was used to ac-
commodate the interests of the delegating and implementing en-
tities. Often it was included as a compromise between the execu-
tive and legislative branches. 15 The beauty of the legislative
veto was that it preserved the ability of Congress to review the
implementation of its policies while at the same time preserving
the executive's flexibility to administer the law.
As articulated by one commentator, the legislative veto rep-
resents an accommodation between the branches, on issues of
interest to each, as a means of best preserving a balance while
accomplishing the needed delegation of power.'59 Through sever-
ance of unconstitutional veto provisions, the basic delegation of
authority remains without the check or contingency of congres-
157. Clokey, INS v. Chadha and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974: A Shift in
the Balance of Power, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 688 (1984).
158. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1983) (All discussed the use
of a legislative veto in achieving the compromise that led to enactment of the statute.
Yet all found the veto provision to be severable based on the preference of saving the
remaining statute and a determination that Congress would have preferred the severance
option to no statute at all.).
159. Moses, supra note 4, at 806.
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sional acquiescence that was part of the statute as originally
structured by the legislature. Simply put, a shift in the power of
decisionmaking occurs. If the significance of the legislative veto
to the statutory scheme is overlooked, an imbalance in power
different from that contemplated by Congress results. In order
to restore the appropriate allocation of power, Congress must re-
place existing unconstitutional veto provisions with alternative
devices. The joint resolution has emerged as a viable mechanism
since it meets constitutional scrutiny, is simple yet effective in
content, and can be acted upon relatively quickly as long as it
contains expedited procedures for timely consideration. While
other means to insure the accountability of independent regula-
tory agencies - through appropriation measures, specific re-
strictions on the agency's statutory authority, and indirectly
through shorter authorization periods and conducting oversight
hearings160 - are available, and could be used to supplement a
joint resolution mechanism, these options are not as efficacious.
Congress has begun to focus on replacement mechanisms for
the legislative veto. This has raised many larger issues, including
the autonomy of independent agencies, their accountability to
the Congress, and the necessity of restrictions on broad delega-
tions of authority, as well as the "workability" of a replacement
device. A case in point involves congressional review of rulemak-
ing by the Federal Trade Commission.
Following closely in the footsteps of Consumers Energy
Council of America v. FERC,6' the District of Columbia Circuit
Court held the congressional veto of the Commission's used car
rule' O62 unconstitutional.1 63 The rule had been promulgated pur-
suant to a congressional directive in § 109(b) of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act to initiate a rulemaking proceeding dealing
with warranties in the sale of used cars.'" Opposition to the rule
160. See Levitas and Brand, Congressional Review of Executive and Agency Ac-
tions After Chadha: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 73 GEo. L. J. 801 (1984)
(discussing alternative devices).
161. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
162. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981)(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 455) (proposed Au-
gust 14, 1981).
163. Consumer Union v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b)(1982).
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stemmed from its required disclosure of known defects, ambigui-
ties in the drafting, unintended effects on the used car market,
and possible conveyance of misinformation to consumers.' 6" De-
spite numerous articulations of legislative intent 66 the rule ex-
ceeded congressional expectations and the delegation of author-
ity. While certain aspects of the rule did comport with the grant
of authority, the rule was vetoed with the hope that the Com-
mission would revise and repromulgate it. 167
A two-House legislative veto provision"6 8 had been included
in the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 to
assure appropriate review of regulations'69 issued by the Com-
mission governing "unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... 17
The breadth of the rulemaking authority was perceived as, and
continues to be, enormous. This is particularly true since neither
"unfair" nor "deceptive" is a defined term in the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' 7 ' These regulations often embody broad policy
165. See additional views of Congressmen Lee and Corcoran, H.R. REP. No. 417,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-30 (1981).
166. See H.R. REP. No. 181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979) ("While no amendment
was offered to the Commission's propose[d] rule on used cars, the Committee is con-
cerned that aspects of that propose[d] rule might violate the congressional intent of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty -Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. The Commit-
tee urges the full Commission to weigh the legislative history carefully before promulgat-
ing a final rule in this area. The Committee intends to monitor closely the rule and hold
hearings, or take other appropriate action, on the subject, if necessary.") See also id. at
44-47 (additional views of Congressman Preyer); S. 1991, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23
(1979) (a provision clarifying that the rule may not require a mandatory warranty or
inspection of used cars); S. REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1979).
167. See H.R. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 27-31, (Dissenting, Additional and
Supplemental Views) (1981).
168. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1
(Supp. III 1985) (omitted as terminated).
169. See additional views of Senators Schmitt and Goldwater, S. REP. No. 184, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979), which expressed the need for a legislative veto:
The Congress has little control over the far-flung activities of this agency short of
passing entirely new legislation. Because of the time and uncertainty involved in
action on a bill which addresses a specific agency action, this approach is not an
effective means of dealing with the many and diverse regulatory activities of the
FTC. What is needed is a systematic procedure for the Congress to express its will
with regard to specific regulatory initiatives.
170. The Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982 &
Supp. 1985).
171. In the past, Congress - both the House and the Senate - included a provision
in reauthorization bills to define "unfair acts or practices." See H.R. 2385, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2 (1985); S. 1078, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1985).
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determinations of considerable economic impact, yet still have
the full force and effect of law despite the absence of congres-
sional consideration. Congressional concern over FTC rulemak-
ing and the appropriate mechanism to facilitate review of its
regulatory end product has been an issue that has continued to
pervade the Commission's reauthorization process.
As the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1980 indicates, the legislative veto provi-
sion was the pivotal factor in achieving the compromise that led
to its enactment. The Commission operated without an authori-
zation from 1977 to 1980 due to the controversy between the
House and the Senate over congressional review of Commission
rules. The House twice rejected conference reports in the 95th
Congress for lack of inclusion of legislative veto provisions." 2 In
the 96th Congress, the Senate included a provision which would
subject Commission rules to congressional review and disap-
proval by joint resolution, which are resolutions acted on by
both Houses and sent to the President for approval, in response
to perceived constitutional concerns with the simple or concur-
rent resolution.17 3 The House bill, H.R. 2313, included a provi-
sion to disapprove rules by concurrent resolution and the House
expressly instructed its conferees to insist on inclusion of a veto
provision in the conference report.17 4
The veto provision was regarded as an essential element to
enhance the Congress' oversight of the agency's activities and, in
particular, to review those regulations which at that time were
regarded as unnecessary, duplicative, or simply ill-advised.17 5 At
that time, an activist Commission had made controversial regu-
latory proposals in areas including funeral practices, used car
sales, and children's advertising. Without the veto, Congress was
compelled to include specific provisions that restricted rulemak-
ing or investigations in particular areas. In the advertising area,
172. 124 CONG. REC. 32,334 (1978). 124 CONG. REC. 5017 (1978).
173. See 126 CONG. REC. 2038-39 (1980).
174. 126 CONG. REC. 4345-47 (1980).
175. See debate on H.R. 2313, The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1979, 125 CONG. REC. 32,454-32,483 (1979). S. REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(1979) (expressing concern over various FTC rulemakings in the areas of used car sales,
advertising, and standards and certification, and over rulemaking procedures in general).
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for example, this provision exists to this day.' 76 Indeed, the con-
gressional debates surrounding the Commission's reauthoriza-
tion is replete with concerns over the regulatory agenda of the
FTC and the breadth of its authority. Questions even arose as to
whether the Commission's rulemaking authority should be reex-
amined by the Congress.177
Given the pivotal nature of the veto provision, it is curious
that no severability analysis was conducted by the court in Con-
sumer's Union v. FTC.178 Had the court engaged in this en-
deavor, it would have discovered the importance that provision
played in achieving a reauthorization in 1980, as the legislative
history demonstrates. Clearly, it was an integral part of the leg-
islation and an essential contingency to the Commission's
rulemaking authority in the eyes of Congress. As the Conference
Report stated:
Under this provision the authority of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to promulgate rules is conditioned on those rules being sub-
mitted to the Congress for review and possible disapproval ....
By requiring that the Commission submit a rule to Congress for
review and possible disapproval, the Congress, under this provi-
sion, hereby provides a mechanism to determine whether a rule
submitted to it by the Commission becomes effective.'7 9
176. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, § 11(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) which has been repeatedly extended in appropriations
measures since its lapse in October, 1982. See most recently, Pub. L. No. 99-591, Making
Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, H.R. REP. No. 1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
71 (1986).
177. See 125 CONG. REC. 32,457 (1979) (remarks of Cong. Bereuter); id. at 32,458
(remarks of Cong. Coughlin); id. at 32,456 (remarks of Cong. Shumway).
178. See Note, supra note 72, at 1187 (argues that the legislative veto provision
could be found severable since it was added as an amendment after the initial grant of
rulemaking power, but recognizes that the amendment could be construed as a "legisla-
tive desire to modify the previous manifestation of intent"). The reasons for not examin-
ing the severability issue may have been twofold. The provision was only temporary in
that it expired at the end of Fiscal Year 1982 (Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act of 1980, § 21, 15 U.S.C. §57a-1 (1982), although it had been extended through an
appropriations bill until September 30, 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 101(d), 96 Stat. 1830,
1870 (1982)). Additionally, the law expressly provided for expedited consideration by the
courts of the constitutionality of the legislative veto. Federal Trade Commission Im-
provements Act of 1980, § 21(f), 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(f)(1982). These two factors taken
together may have been read as limiting a reviewing court's inquiry to the constitutional
question and as evidence of the uncertainty of Congress behind the legislative veto in-
herent in the nature of a temporary provision.
179. H.R. REP. No. 917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1980).
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Justice White alluded to the importance of the FTC veto in
his dissent to the Court's affirmance of United States Senate v.
FTC,180 noting that Congress debated the breadth of the FTC's
rulemaking authority and settled upon the legislative veto provi-
sion as a means for Congress to review the expansive and critical
policy pronouncements made by the FTC."'1
Congress continues to wrestle with a replacement mecha-
nism for review of the Commission's rulemaking activities. In
the 99th Congress, legislation languished in conference for lack
of an agreement on this issue. The House bill, H.R. 2385, con-
tained a simple joint resolution of disapproval, without expe-
dited procedures.182 The Senate counterpart, S. 1078, included a
similar mechanism for rules issued by the FTC and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) but did have special
procedures for expedited consideration of resolutions. 183 The ap-
propriateness of expedited procedures is basically a political bat-
tle over the ability of the leadership to completely control the
consideration of legislation, coupled with the amount of defer-
ence that should be given to the particular agency's ability to
regulate. The importance of expedited procedures cannot be
overstated, as they ensure that a timely and fair vote will be
taken on the issue at hand and that the collective desire of the
Congress will not be preempted by a few. Controversy over the
inclusion of these procedures, together with other issues, led to a
stalemate. As a result, the Commission continues to operate
without an authorization, as it has since fiscal year 1983.184
180. 463 U.S. 1216 (1982).
181. Id. at 1218 (White, J., dissenting).
182. A request was made to the House Rules Committee on August 1, 1985 to per-
mit an amendment to be offered on the floor. With time, it became clear that the Rules
Committee would not allow an amendment, denying the House the ability to vote on this
issue. The amendment was reluctantly withdrawn. The bill was considered thereafter
under the suspension of the Rules procedure (See House Rule XXVII), which requires a
super-majority for passage, and effectively limits those amendments which can be offered
to the bill. See 131 CONG. REc. H7501-2 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1985) (statements of Reps.
Lott and Lent).
183. See S. 1078, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 16, 17 (1985), 131 CONG. REC. 10,170-75
(daily ed. July 26, 1985), which provides for legislative veto of rules issued by the Federal
Trade Commission and Consumer Product Safety Commission.
184. In the first session of the 100th Congress, the Senate acted on legislation (S.
677) reauthorizing the Commission, and reinserted the same veto provision for FTC rules
contained in the preceding Congress' Senate bill. See 131 CONG. REC. S4625-8 (daily ed.
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Efforts are still afoot to provide for an across-the-board leg-
islative review for all agency rulemaking. Last Congress, the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 1145, the Rulemaking
Procedures Reform Act of 1985. The purpose of the legislation
was to "rebuild the legislative veto of agency regulations as a
means of increasing [agency] accountability, consistent with the
constitutional requirements for legislative action, as defined by
the Supreme Court. '185 The legislation amended the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act186 to subject agency rules to congressional
review and disapproval by joint resolution, with provisions for
expedited consideration. Under the terms of the bill, rules were
considered recommendations187 and had no legal effect until the
congressional review period had expired without enactment of a
disapproval resolution. Rules were classified into two categories,
major and nonmajor, as defined by their economic impact, with
different time periods for congressional review. If both Houses
passed a disapproval resolution with respect to a rule, a point of
order could be raised if an appropriations bill for the relevant
agency did not contain a provision prohibiting the use of funds
to implement the rule.188 This provision was designed as an en-
forcement mechanism to ensure that the agency does not use ap-
propriated funds to implement the rule disapproved by Con-
gress. As such, these restrictions contained in appropriations
statutes would act as an effective check on the agency and would
ensure that the will of Congress is carried out.
Similar legislation, H.R. 1339, the Regulatory Oversight and
Apr. 6, 1987).
185. S. REP. No. 492, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
186. Section 3 of S. 1145 added a new chapter 8 to title 5 of the United States Code.
187. Section 3(a) of S. 1145.
188. See S. REP. No. 492, supra note 185, at 4. The Department of Justice has ex-
pressed concern that this procedure bypasses the President in that it preempts the Exec-
utive's review of a congressional determination to disapprove an agency rule. This as-
sumes that the appropriations bill at issue will reach the President's desk before the
joint resolution, which given the short time frame for congressional review, is a large
assumption. Further, the President does play a role in the appropriations process as the
Executive does in other legislation under the presentment requirement of article I, § 7,
cl. 2 of the Constitution. Finally, this provision amends the internal rules of the House to
enable a Member to make a point of order against consideration of an appropriations bill
consistent with the ability of each House granted by the Constitution to determine the
rules of its proceedings (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2). For a similar mechanism see S.
1078, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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Control Act of 1985, was introduced in the House by Congress-
man Trent Lott. Although it adopted a similar distinction be-
tween major rules and other than major rules, the bill subjected
major rules to an approval, rather than a disapproval process.
Regulations issued would have had no effect unless specifically
approved by Congress through the passage of a joint resolution.
Conversely, rules other than major rules would have become ef-
fective unless disapproved. Expedited procedures were included
and a regulatory review calendar was created in the House to
handle increased floor activity in the consideration of resolu-
tions. To ensure that Congress did not preempt the judiciary, a
provision was included to clarify that congressional approval of a
rule would have no presumptive effect with respect to the valid-
ity or review of the rule under the Administrative Procedures
Act. 8"
VIII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's Chadha decision altered the delicate
balance of power that existed between the Congress and the in-
dependent and executive agencies to which it delegates power.
The aftershocks of Chadha are still being felt. As courts ex-
amine the question of whether a veto provision is severable from
the body of a statute, the issue of separation of powers pervades
the analysis. The appropriate inquiry should focus on the alloca-
tion of power intended by Congress in making the original dele-
gation of authority and the significance attached to the veto pro-
vision in the statutory scheme in striking that balance. The
effect of severance should be examined and its consistency with
the desire of Congress to retain a role in the implementation of
that authority through the legislative veto should be assessed.
The function and utility of the veto, as a procedural device,
should not be overshadowed by the desire to retain the substan-
tive portions of the statute. Judicial rewriting of legislation,
under the cloak of seeking to preserve as much of the underlying
statute as possible, is not only inappropriate, but also borders on
an intrusion into the legislative domain.
Congress will continue its efforts to replace the legislative
189. H.R. 1339, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 807(b) (1985).
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veto and to restore its lost authority over the implementation of
delegated functions. It is only through a replacement device that
Congress will truly fulfill its constitutional function, envisioned
by the Framers over two hundred years ago, to write the laws of
our nation. If the Government is to function effectively, account-
ability and checks on the exercise of delegated power is essen-
tial. The legislative veto fulfilled that role. Its replacement needs
to be quickly and effectively found and the prerogatives of the
legislative branch regained and asserted.
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